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decrease discrepancies that can occur between the different dispatch solutions.
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For a given minimum cost of the electricity dispatch, multiple equivalent dispatch solutions may
exist. We explore the sensitivity of networks to these dispatch solutions and their impact on the
vulnerability of the network to cascading failure blackouts. It is shown that, depending on the
heterogeneity of the network structure, the blackout statistics can be sensitive to the dispatch solution
chosen, with the clustering coefficient of the network being a key ingredient. We also investigate
mechanisms or configurations that decrease discrepancies that can occur between the different
dispatch solutions. Published by AIP Publishing. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.4967736]
The OPA (ORNL-PSerc-Alaska) model has been used to
explore the power networks’ robustness as characterized
by the risk of large failures and temporal dynamics. In
this model, the power demand is increased at a constant
rate while the generation is periodically increased in
response to the demand. In doing so, the system keeps the
generation capacity margin above a given value. Each
day power is dispatched, and generation is selected and
optimized to exactly balance the load with minimum cost.
This optimization problem is degenerate (there can be
more than one optimal solution), so many different dis-
patch procedures are possible. As one might expect, even
if the dispatch solutions are exactly equivalent from the
optimization point of view (they reach the same optimal
value), it is found that the long term statistics of the prob-
lem (power law tails, risk of failures, etc.) can be quite
different. In this work, we try to understand how the
structure of the network affects the sensitivity of the long
term statistics to the dispatch solution chosen. We have
found that linked networks are more sensitive to the dis-
patch chosen than homogeneous networks. In other
words, in the case of linked networks, the simulation
results can strongly differ when the dispatch is modified.
Of particular note, the average clustering coefficient of
the network is found to be one of the key measures that
affect such sensitivity: the higher it is, the stronger the
sensitivity of the long term statistics to the dispatch cho-
sen. A possible explanation of such behavior is that a
small clustering coefficient reduces the degeneracy of the
problem. In addition, we study different ways of reducing
the sensitivity to the dispatch in the linked network.
From a practical standpoint, the results can be used to
properly apply the dispatch solution that is superior to
the others from the computational point of view.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power transmission networks as well as many other
critical infrastructure networks come in a wide variety of
shapes and sizes but share the characteristics that they are
responding to ever-changing demands and are being pushed
ever closer to their operational limits. This push toward their
operational limit, combined with the operational and engi-
neering responses when there are failures, gives the system
characteristics of a critical point, heavy tails (failure size
probability distribution functions that decay as a power law),
and long time correlations. Understanding these characteris-
tics is critical to both doing realistic risk analysis of cascad-
ing blackouts and to assessing the impact and risks of
changes to the system and mitigation schemes.
We use the OPA (ORNL-PSerc-Alaska) model to
explore the power networks’ robustness as characterized by
the risk of large failures and temporal dynamics. The OPA
model1–3 was developed to study the long-term patterns of
blackout of a power transmission system under the complex
system dynamics of an increasing power demand and the
engineering responses to failure. In this model, the power
demand is increased at a constant rate while also being mod-
ulated by random fluctuations. The generation capacity is
automatically increased when the capacity margin is below a
given critical level. From the numerical point of view, OPA
solves at least one optimization problem for the calculation
of the power generation-demand and transmission (the dis-
patch solution) per “day”. Each optimization problem is
solved using the Simplex algorithm.4–6
Using the OPA model, we have been able to study and
characterize the mechanisms behind the power law tails in
the distribution of the blackout size. These algebraic tails
obtained in the numerical calculations are consistent with
those observed in blackouts of real power systems.7–13 Most
importantly, the OPA model permits us to separate the
underlying causes for cascading blackouts from the triggers
that initiate them and therefore explore system characteris-
tics that enhance or degrade resilience and reliability of the
power transmission grid. One of these characteristics, the
one investigated here, is the network structure and the het-
erogeneity of the network induced by linking homogeneous
structures. With these different network structures, the issue
of multiple different “optimal” dispatch solutions in systems
of varying degrees of homogeneity can then be investigated.
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This is both relevant and important because many of the
real, large transmission grids are the result of linking smaller
networks, and understanding risk vulnerability from both
the network structure and dispatch operations is critical. A
major example is the Western region of North America (the
Western Electricity Coordinating Council or WECC) in
which the population dense areas have denser grids that are
interconnected by a smaller number of lines.14 The resultant
inhomogeneous grid looks like a loop of pearls (Fig. 1). The
aim of this paper is to show that this type of grid characteris-
tic may complicate the modeling of the dispatch of electric-
ity in order to properly analyze the propagation of the
cascading failures through the system. These issues will be
examined with the OPA model.
In more detail, to test the sensitivity of different net-
works to the electricity dispatch, we use three variants of the
Simplex algorithm in order to have different dispatch solu-
tions for the same minimum of the cost. The difference
between variants is in the pivot rule chosen. Under these dif-
ferent dispatch conditions, we will compare the dynamics of
three sequences of networks. Each sequence is composed by
a set of networks, each of them with a different number of
nodes (from 100 to 1600). The sequences differ in the topo-
logical properties of the networks.
In a recent related work, the letter by Liu and Li17 also
describes the multiplicity of different dispatch solutions
using OPA, some with similar generation cost, and shows
that the dispatch solutions that maximize or minimize the
number of overloaded lines during the cascade have differ-
ent total costs that are the sum of the generation and out-
age costs. They suggest that the worst case dispatch should
be considered in assessing cascading risk and that opera-
tors should be advised of the dispatch plans that best mini-
mize cascading. In our work, the emphasis is on the
relation between the structure of the network and the dis-
crepancies between the different dispatch solutions. Also
we study how such discrepancies can be minimized with a
slight modification of the model or the dispatch. If the dis-
crepancies between dispatches are small, there is an extra
benefit: the computationally most efficient dispatch can
be used, reducing the wallclock time required for the
simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
briefly describes the OPA model and Sec. III discusses the
type of networks used in this paper. Section IV discusses the
sensitivity to the dispatch solutions and looks for the origin
of the underlying differences. Sec. V shows modifications in
the dispatch in order to reduce the discrepancies between the
different solutions. Finally, Sec. VI summarizes the work.
II. THE OPA MODEL
To study the long time complex systems dynamics of
the power transmission system, we use the OPA model.1–3
The OPA model calculates the long time behavior of a power
transmission system under the forcing of an increasing power
demand and the engineering/operational responses to failure
in order to study the cascading failures in the system. In this
model, the network is composed of a set of nodes i ¼ 1;
…;N that can be generators or loads (or a mix of both).
The nodes are connected via a set of transmission lines
j ¼ 1;…;M. The power demand Pi in a load node i increases
at a constant rate k plus daily random fluctuations with vari-
ance c. There are two sorts of upgrades to meet the increase
in demand. Transmission lines are upgraded as engineering
responses to blackouts and maximum generator power is
increased in response to the increasing demand. The trans-
mission lines selected for upgrade are those overloaded
transmission lines involved in a blackout. The transmission
lines are upgraded by increasing their maximum flow Fmaxj
limits at rate l. On generator nodes, the maximum genera-
tion power Pmaxi increases automatically when the capacity
margin, DP=P, is below a given critical level. In the present
studies, this is done by increasing the power limit on all gen-
erators so we keep the same generation profiles as in the
existing situation.18,19
The OPA model for a given network represents trans-
mission lines, loads, and generators with the usual DC load
flow approximation. Starting from a solved base case, black-
outs are initiated by random line outages. Whenever a line
is outaged, the generation and load are redispatched using
standard linear programming methods. Since the generation
capacity of the grid is larger than the usual power demand,
it is necessary to determine which generator should be used
to balance the load in an optimal way that minimizes costs
FIG. 1. A 2504 node model of the
WECC. Color indicates the base case
voltage phasor angle.
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and satisfies the transmission constraints. If any lines were
overloaded in the minimization solution, then these lines are
outaged with probability p1. The process of redispatch and
testing for outages is iterated until there are no more out-
ages. Then, the total load shed is the power lost in the
blackout.
Because of its importance, the minimization process is
now described in detail. The cost function to be minimized
Zðp1;…; pNÞ ¼
X
generators
aipi þ
X
loads
100pi; (1)
where ai ¼ 1 (except in Sec. V) and pi is the power injected/
extracted on node i (depending if node i is a generator or
load). Note that pi > 0 for generator nodes and pi < 0 for
load nodes. The objective is to find the set of values for pi
that minimizes Z subject to the following constrains:
• Overall power balance:
XN
i¼1
pi ¼ 0
• Line flow limits:
Fmaxj  fj  Fmaxj ; j ¼ 1;…;M
• Load limits:
Pi  pi  0; i load
• Generator limits:
0 < pi < P
max
i ; i generator
Note that, because the weighting of the loads (100) is larger
than the weighting of the generators (ai), the priority in the
minimization process is to satisfy the loads demand when-
ever possible (this is, pi ¼ Pi for i ¼ 1;N).
To solve the proposed minimization problem, we use
the Simplex method.4–6 There are two stages in the Simplex
algorithm. In the first stage, a “feasible” solution is found
that solves the problem but is not necessarily the optimal
solution. The second stage is a search procedure to find the
optimal solution by following paths in the solution space.
This search procedure requires formulating the problem in
the matrix form and carrying out a standard iterative algo-
rithm. In each iteration, a process called pivoting swaps one
of the variables associated with a column in the matrix with
one variable associated with a row in the matrix. We will not
go into more detail of pivoting here but rather refer the
reader to the specialized bibliography.15,16 The interesting
point is that the pivoting procedure can be understood as the
way in which the solver looks for the optimal solution. This
is in a sense the dispatch method so that different pivoting
rules can be thought of as different dispatch rules. The better
the solver is, the faster the optimal solution is found. There
are many ways of doing the pivoting called “pivot rules”. In
this work, we have chosen three different pivoting rules for
the three solvers that we use:
• Solver 1 uses one of the first pivot rules developed, the
Dantzig rule.4,15 Roughly speaking, in each iteration, the
solver just looks for the variable whose maximization
coefficient is larger.
• Solver 2 uses the Devex pivot rule,16 an approximation of
Steepest-edge rule (see solver 3).
• Solver 3 uses the Steepest-edge rule.20 This rule chooses
the variable for pivoting that, when modified, gives the
largest gradient of the maximization function in the solu-
tion space. This rule is generally thought to work very
well for many optimization problems.
From the computational point of view, Solver 1 is the
slowest of the three; it is about 10 times slower than the
Solver 3. Solver 2 is the fastest, being about a factor of four
faster than the Solver 3. One could expect that applying the
three solvers to the same network problem, the same optimal
solution would be found. However, in our problem, depend-
ing on the network, sometimes the three solvers find different
solutions.17 Despite the different solutions, the cost function
reached is the same for the three solvers. This indicates
degeneracy in the problem, something that might be
expected because many configurations of the generators can
supply the power to the loads and thus have the same cost.
This degeneracy is even more noticeable for the present cal-
culations because we have the same cost for all generators in
the networks.
We can interpret the three solvers as three different dis-
patch policies that have different effects depending on the
network structures. Thus, it is interesting to study the sensi-
tivity of our results to the “dispatch policy” used. It should
be noted that this study does not aspire to systematically
study the possible and potentially more intelligent ways of
doing a correct power dispatch. However as an initial inves-
tigation of possible effects of different dispatch rules, inter-
esting results are obtained, even with the simple selection of
solvers just described. Furthermore, techniques to reduce the
discrepancies between the solutions while preserving the
complex dynamics will allow us to use the computationally
most efficient solver.
Finally, the parameters that we use in the OPA model
are shown in Table I. Of the six basic parameters that control
the slow time evolution of the system in OPA,1,2 four (the
demand growth rate, the generation margin, the load vari-
ance, and the upgrade rate) have been estimated from the
data available for the US power transmission grid14,21 and
are shown in Table I. The other two model parameters,
which are very important in the determination of the dynam-
ics, are the probability p0 of failure of a component by a
daily random event and the probability p1 of a transmission
TABLE I. OPA parameters used.
Variable name Symbol Value
Daily rate of increase of the demand k 1.00005
Critical generation margin Dp=p 0.2
Variance of loads c 1.15
Upgrade rate l 1.07
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line overload becoming an outage. p0 represents the chances
of random accidental failures while p1 is a measure of the
reliability of system components and their interactions,
which impacts the propagation of failures through the sys-
tem. Ranges for p0 and p1 can be estimated from data though
with less certainty. Therefore, several values of p0 and p1
will be considered in what follows.
III. NETWORKS USED IN THE CALCULATIONS
Using the parameters discussed, the main additional
input to OPA is a model network. The OPA model has been
validated against the real WECC network using different
size network models and real grid models.14 In this work, we
use three sequences of artificial networks with realistic net-
work characteristics, each of them composed of networks
with 100, 200, 400, 800, and 1600 nodes.
• The first sequence is composed of homogeneous artificial
networks generated using the method of Wang et al.21 In a
first stage of the method, the N nodes of the network are
placed with a uniform random distribution in a square of
normalized area S¼ 1. In a second stage, a set of links are
found such that they follow a prescribed distribution for
the average node degree and the average line length. The
impedance of each line is obtained as a function of its
length. Let us name this sequence of networks H. Thus,
H100 will refer to the homogeneous network of N¼ 100
nodes, H200 to the homogeneous network of N¼ 200
nodes, and so on. Here, when we use the word homoge-
neous we refer to the topological and engineering proper-
ties of the network, not to the possible space distribution
of the network. We use the term homogeneous to contrast
with the linked networks that will be introduced later. By
increasing/decreasing the area while keeping the average
node degree and average line length constant, the sparsity
of the nodes increases/decreases and mean distance (in
hops) between nodes increases/decreases.
• The second sequence of networks is constructed by linking
a number of the homogeneous networks, each of which
contain a prescribed number of nodes. Each of the homo-
geneous networks, after the linkage, will be referred to as
a zone. Here, we use balanced linked networks, which are
networks with similar levels of power generation and
demand in each of the homogeneous zones. The resistivity
of the linking lines has been chosen following the distribu-
tion of resistivity in the homogeneous networks. The case
H100 is used as base for each zone. Let us name this
sequence of networks as L. Thus, a linked network com-
posed of 4 clusters of 100 nodes will be named as L4100.
Two examples are shown in Fig. 2. For the whole L
sequence, the different zones are connected by a ring topol-
ogy. It is important to avoid confusions and make clear that
these networks are in reality networks formed from loosely
interconnected sub-networks, but we use the denomination
linked networks to be brief when referring to them.
• Finally, a third sequence will be used (named Hbig) also
composed with the same algorithm as sequence H. The
reason for introducing this sequence is to obtain a homo-
geneous sequence similar to L (the linked one) from the
point of view of the structure of the network. In particular,
we try to obtain a similar curve for the average node path
length and the average clustering coefficient to that of the L
sequence. These quantities are important to characterize the
structure of a network and will be introduced in detail later
in this section. As shown in Fig. 3, both the average node
path length and the average clustering coefficients have a
strong dependence on S, the area of the square used for
building the networks. Thus, this will be the parameter
used as a degree of freedom to build the sequence Hbig. In
particular, the networks in the sequence are built with
S ¼ N=100, this is, the area of the network grows linearly
with the number of nodes. For visual comparison, in Fig. 4,
the standard H800 homogeneous network is shown in the
left panel and Hbig800 is shown in the right panel.
There is still an open issue. When building the sequence
L, we limited the number of links between zones to 2 (to
keep the non homogeneity of the network), but there are
many ways one can link the zones. One important criterion
we use in the linking process is to minimize the cost of trans-
ferring energy from one zone to another. If we choose the
nodes to be connected in such a way that the average path
length between nodes in the network hli has the lowest possi-
ble value, the transmission costs are minimized. In practice,
the minimization of hli or the average resistance hgi of the
lines between nodes leads to the same linked solutions
because the impedence is proportional to the line length. The
length hli is defined as the average value of li over all nodes:
FIG. 2. Examples of four (left) and
eight (right) 100 node linked networks:
L4100 and L8100, respectively. Each
zone is colored differently.
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hli ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
li; (2)
where li is the average path length of node i to all other
nodes:
li ¼ 1
N
XN
j¼1
dij; (3)
where N is the number of nodes in the network and the dis-
tance dij between the node i and node j is defined as the mini-
mum number of lines traversed in going from one node to
another. A similar definition to that of hli can be used to
define hgi.
In the case of the sequences of the homogeneous net-
works H and Hbig, the average path length hli increases very
slowly with the number of nodes of the network, as shown in
Fig. 5. However, in the case of a linked network the value of
hli depends on how the network has been constructed. If we
just choose the nodes to be linked at random, the average
path length between each node and all the other nodes can be
very large compared with the homogeneous case, as shown
in Fig. 5. This is because in going from one node to any other
we have to move through the linking lines when we go from
one zone to the other and the position of the linking lines
may not be optimal to minimize this distance. On the other
hand if, as previously mentioned, hli is minimized in the
linking (and thus the cost), then the hli scaling is similar to
those of the homogeneous cases. This last option is the crite-
ria for the construction of the network sequences L used in
the rest of the paper. As a side note, it is interesting to notice
that using this linking criterion for the networks not only
minimizes transmission costs but also reduces the vulnerabil-
ity of the network to large size failures as we have shown in
Ref. 22.
The average path length between nodes is one of the
measures that are typically used when analyzing networks.
There is another important measure used less frequently, the
average clustering coefficient, which measures the degree to
which nodes in a network tend to cluster together. The aver-
age clustering coefficient C can be defined as23
C ¼ 1
N
XN
n¼1
Cn; (4)
where Cn is the local clustering coefficient of the node n:
FIG. 3. Average path length hli and averaged clustering coefficient C for
networks of size N¼ 800 as a function of network area S. The algorithm
used to compose the networks is the same used when building sequences H
and Hbig but keeping N constant and modifying the value of S.
FIG. 4. Comparison of the homoge-
neous networks H800 (left) and H
big
800
(right).
FIG. 5. Average path length in the network as a function of size for the dif-
ferent sequences of networks analyzed (H, L, Hbig) and random linked.
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Cn ¼ en
kn kn  1ð Þ ; (5)
where kn is the number of neighbors of n and en is the num-
ber of connected pairs between all neighbors of n.
As explained, the homogeneous sequence Hbig was built
to emulate the structure of the linked sequence L. As seen in
Fig. 6, both network sequences show a large very constant
C, when compared with the sequence H that decays with the
size of the grid. The constant C associated with the sequence
Hbig makes sense when we realize that the area of the net-
works grows linearly with N as S ¼ N=100: if for example,
we duplicate the number of nodes of the network at the same
time as the area, the connectivity between nodes found by
the algorithm that built the networks will be, on average, the
same. And the value of S¼ 1 for the case N¼ 100 makes
that network equivalent to the H100, and this is because both
sequences converge in Fig. 6 at the point N¼ 100. Of course
at that point also the linked sequence will converge because
L1100 is also equivalent to H100.
In Sec. IV, using the three sequences of networks just
described, we will analyze how important the differences are
between the simulations of the different solvers (dispatch
solutions), the underlying reasons for them in the model, and
what effect the network structure has on the differences.
IV. OPA RESULTS FOR THE NETWORK SIZE SCAN:
SENSITIVITY TO THE DETAILS OF THE DISPATCH
A. Homogeneous sequence H
Now we can start to investigate the effect of different
dispatch procedures on different network structures. First,
we use the OPA model with each of the three solvers intro-
duced in Sec. II to study the dynamical evolution of the
sequence of homogeneous networks H100, H200, H400, H800,
and H1600. Once again, the three solvers give different solu-
tions for dispatch, although the minimum cost is the same
for the three solvers. For a fixed set of parameters, we can
compare the failure statistics of the model systems with the
different dispatch procedures (really the different solvers).
For this sequence of networks, the statistical results are
remarkably virtually the same for the three solvers within the
expected statistical uncertainty due to the finite size of the
samples, as shown in Fig. 7. In this work, we will start by
focusing on two measures of the failure statistics important
for complex system dynamics. In Fig. 7(a), we compare the
frequency of blackouts for the solutions of the three solvers.
These results are for p1 ¼ 0:037 and p0 ¼ 0:00025, although
similar results are obtained for other values of the parame-
ters. We can see the similarity of the frequency curves for
the 3 solvers, although there is a systematic deviation, still
within error bars, for solver 2, giving slightly higher values
of the blackout frequency. It should be noted that the
increase in frequency with size in this figure comes from the
fixed p0 which causes p0N, the total probability of a trigger,
to grow with size. In Fig. 7(b), for the H1600 network we
have plotted the Rank function of the load shed during each
blackout normalized to the total power demand. The Rank
function measures the complementary cumulative distribu-
tion function (ccdf) and is a method for measuring the tail of
the distribution and therefore the probability of the large rare
events that can dominate the risk. Again, we can see that the
results obtained by the three solvers are very close. These
results from the OPA model seem to indicate that although
the dispatch solution is different for the three solvers, it does
not matter for the statistical results of the model for the
homogeneous networks of varying size.
B. Linked sequence L
Following the same reasoning, we now apply the same
analysis with the same OPA parameters to a sequence of linked
networks. Remember that each linked network is built by link-
ing several 100-node homogeneous networks. The particular
networks used are L1100; L2100; L4100; L8100, and L16100,
and the results for this sequence are quite different from the
sequence of homogeneous networks. In Fig. 8(a), we have
again plotted the frequency of blackouts. The minimum costs
for the three solvers are, as with the homogeneous networks,
relatively close. However, the blackout size distributions are
completely different, as is shown in Fig. 8(b). The Rank func-
tions have very different tails for the three cases considered.
The tail for the first dispatch method, solver 1, is somewhat
heavier than that for the third, solver 3, while the distribution
for the second method, solver 2, has a very heavy tail.
Differences can also be studied as a function of one of
the most important metrics of the problem from a practical
point of view: the risk of blackout. There are many ways to
calculate Risk. One measure for the risk is proposed in Ref.
24. In brief, the measure is an integrated value for the risk
taking into account the size of the blackout into the cost. The
risk associated with failure i is then defined as:
RiskðiÞ ¼ ProbabilityðiÞ  CostðiÞ: (6)
The probability of an event Probability(i) is obtained from
the OPA simulations. The cost associated with the event
Cost(i) is more difficult to accurately determine, as discussed
in Ref. 24.
However, based on that reference and as a simple first
approach, the cost is set proportional to the product of energy
lost during the blackout,25 that is, the power lost times the
FIG. 6. Average clustering coefficient C in the network as a function of size
for the three types of network sequences H and Hbig and L.
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duration of the blackout. The duration of the blackout we
assume to be proportional to the size of the blackout and
therefore to the energy lost is proportional to the square of
the blackout size. Then, for an event with load shed Lshed the
risk is
Risk Lshedð Þ ¼ BP2  probability Lshedð Þ  Lshed
P
 2
; (7)
where B is a constant and P is the total power demand and
Lshed=P is therefore the normalized load shed. Finally, the
total risk value is obtained by integrating Eq. (7) over all
possible load shed and using the load shed distribution
obtained from the OPA simulations. The interested reader
can find more details of the implementation on the reference.
Here, we only use the risk as an integrated measure of the
differences between dispatch solutions. In Fig. 9, we show
the risk as a function of the network size for the linked
sequence. The differences between solvers grow with the
system size N, probably due to the extra degrees of freedom
that allow the solvers to increase the divergence.
As previously discussed, the three solvers give the same
value for the minimum cost for the same initial condition of
the solver; however, the solutions are clearly not the same
and the probability of a large failure, and the tail, is greatly
different in the three cases. We can find some of the causes
of these differences by looking at the distribution of the frac-
tional loading of the lines, Mi, coming from the different
solvers with the same conditions of the network. The frac-
tional line loading for line i, Mi, is the ratio of the power
flow in line i, Fi, to the maximum power flow allowed in this
line, Fmaxi . Using identical initial conditions for the different
solvers after calculating the dispatch on a single iteration, we
can plot the distribution of the Mi for the two solvers that
give the maximum discrepancy. The results for solvers 2 and
3 are shown in Fig. 10(a) for the H1600 network and in Fig.
10(b) for the L16100 network. The distribution has a peak
FIG. 7. (a) Frequency of blackouts as a
function of the size of the homoge-
neous network and (b) rank function of
the load shed for the particular case
H1600. They are obtained with the OPA
model for the three solvers.
FIG. 8. (a) Frequency of blackouts as a
function of the size of the linked net-
works and (b) rank function of the load
shed for the L16100 network. They are
obtained with the OPA model for the
three solvers.
FIG. 9. Risk measure as a function of the nodes number N for the L
sequence of networks using the different solvers. The three sequences con-
verge on the case N¼ 100 because there is only one zone, so this case is
equivalent to the homogeneous H100.
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above Mi ¼ 0:8 because of the combination of two effects.
On one hand, the self-organization of the system drives the
lines to be close to their operational limits so lines move Mi
to be above 0.8. On the other hand, for Mi  0:9, lines fail
with probability p1 so there are few lines with Mi above 0.9.
For the homogeneous network, the fractional line load-
ing given by the solvers to each line is not the same for all
lines; however, the overall distribution is very similar. Note
that solver 2 has a few more lines over the value of M¼ 0.9,
so this solution is slightly more vulnerable. For the linked
network, the difference between distributions is dramatic;
solver 3 gives a very much more conservative solution than
solver 2’s solution with lower values of M. Because the p1
gives the probability of failure of lines with M> 0.9, for the
same value of p1, the solution from solver 2 has a larger
chance of failure and the subsequent cascading process will
be a great deal longer. This is an indication that the linked
systems are more sensitive to a dispatch than the homoge-
neous ones, and the vulnerability of the system varies with
the details of the dispatch solutions.
The increased overloading of lines by solver 3 in the
linked network case may be a consequence of the selection of
generators from which the dispatched power is chosen. For
the same case shown in Fig. 10(b), we show in Fig. 11 the dis-
tribution of the generation power by the zones that have been
linked. The demand is practically the same in the 16 zones;
however, the power generation dispatch varies depending on
the solvers. Solver 3 gives a practically uniform dispatch by
zones; this is the solver with lower values of Mi and a less
heavy tail. However, the generation varies a great deal from
zone to zone for solver 2; this dispatch also has most of the
higher values of Mi and the heaviest tail. Solver 1 gives more
variation in the generation distribution than solver 3, but is
not as bad as solver 2 and hence has the tail which is in the
middle in terms of heaviness. Finally, note that any trend in
Fig. 11 is purely algorithmic: each node has associated an
ordering number when the network is build (with a ring topol-
ogy). The dispatch solver tends to pick up this order of the
nodes in beginning of the dispatch. For example, solver 2 tries
to dispatch starting from the lowest node number generator,
which is one of the roots of its problems (visible in Fig. 11 as
an unbalance in the generation).
Naturally, in real systems, the operators do the most
intelligent dispatch they can and some of the problems men-
tioned here might not be relevant in a real network; however,
they are important in the building of models for the net-
works’ dynamics in order to do the optimal dispatch. The
present results indicate that the Solver 3 does the best job. In
Sec. V, we will discuss methods to reduce the vulnerability
of the networks to the type of dispatch.
C. Homogeneous sequence Hbig
An important issue still left open is whether the sensitiv-
ity of the networks to the dispatch is only due to the fact that
they were linked networks or if there are other possible
parameters that could also be affecting their sensitivity to
dispatch. In this section, we investigate homogeneous net-
works where the parameter S (the area where the nodes of
the network are placed) is varied as S¼N/100. Remember
that the effect of this variation is to obtain similar structural
properties to the linked sequence, while keeping the homoge-
neous character. The corresponding sequence is composed of
the networks Hbig100; H
big
200; H
big
400; H
big
800, and H
big
1600.
FIG. 10. Distribution of the fraction of
load of the lines after a single step
using solvers 1, 2 and 3 for: (a) H1600
network and (b) L16100 network.
FIG. 11. Distribution of the generation power by the zones for the L16100
network using the three solvers.
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We find that the Hbig sequence shows a similar sensitiv-
ity to the dispatch to that of the linked one. An example of
the size distributions is shown in Fig. 12. It is clear that the
big network with dispatch solver 2 has the heavier tail, very
similar to the linked networks. This result is not surprising
from the structural point of view, because both sequences are
similar. But from a modeling point of view, both sequences
have a very different origin, so it is important to be careful
and not suggest that the linking property is the only property
responsible for the enhanced discrepancies between the dif-
ferent solvers. The parameter S (area of the network) can
also have a similar effect as perhaps could other parameters.
D. Effect of hli and C on the discrepancies
Up to this point, we have found that, due to the degener-
acy of the problem, the different solvers (the different dis-
patch solutions) can cause different results in the long term
complex system dynamics. The differences between the
results of the simulations can be enhanced or reduced depend-
ing on the structure of the network. It is important to empha-
size here that the dispatch solutions applied to each network
simulation are exactly the same, but the difference between
the simulations final results depends on the network structure.
In this section, we try to determine the correlations between
this difference and the structure of the network interpreted as
an undirected graph. Namely, is there any graph measure that
correlates with the discrepancy? There are many related
works studying the interplay between the power grid and its
topology (see, for example, Refs. 26 and 27) but here we par-
ticularize the analysis to the OPA model results. We do not
find large changes in the average path length hli curves
between the three sequences studied (Fig. 5), which suggests
that it is not a critical measure in distinguishing between the
networks sensitive to the solver and those which are insensi-
tive. However, the average clustering coefficient C curves of
the different sequences (Fig. 6) show interesting differences.
Both network sequences L and Hbig that present the largest
differences between the different dispatch methods (espe-
cially for large N) also show a large C, when compared with
the sequence H which is rather insensitive to the solver used.
This suggests a correlation between a high value of C and
large differences between the different dispatch solutions.
The fact that the sequence Hbig is completely different from L
but is similar from the structural point of view and shows a
similar behaviour to that in the L cases also adds support to
this argument.
An interesting question opens up: why is a large value
of C correlated with the differences? A possible explanation
is that a large clustering coefficient allows for many more
ways of dispatching the power to different nodes and regions
(see Fig. 13), giving extra degrees of freedom that increase
the degeneracy of the minimization problem. Thus, the dif-
ferences in the solutions between the different Simplex solv-
ers can be large. On the other hand, a small clustering
coefficient does not allow for many options of dispatch,
keeping the solutions of the different Simplex solvers close.
Finally, it is important to add that the parameter C is not
the only ingredient, even if it is an important one. For exam-
ple, the linked sequence L shows a similar value for the C in
all the network sizes. The discrepancy between solvers
increases with the number of nodes, so N is also an important
parameter.
V. OPA RESULTS FOR THE NETWORK SIZE SCAN:
REDUCING THE DISPATCH VARIABILITY
In this section, we will explore modifications in the dis-
patch solution required to reduce the discrepancy between
the different Simplex solvers. This helps in understanding
the underlying dynamics, understanding what makes a good
versus bad dispatch and also results in more robust dispatch
FIG. 12. Rank function of the load shed for the H
big
800 network for solvers 1, 2
and 3.
FIG. 13. Example of simple networks
with different clustering coefficients:
(a) C ¼ 1, (b) C ¼ 0:3, and (c) C ¼ 0.
Clearly the network (c) will show less
possible dispatch solutions and thus
less degeneracy.
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solutions that are independent of the algorithm used for the
minimization. Also it allows the use of the Simplex solver
that is computationally more efficient. The results of Sec. IV
suggest three approaches to solving the discrepancies
between the solvers’ dispatches.
One simple approach considers the vulnerability of the
lines as arising from the distribution of the lines with
M> 0.9 combined with the value of p1. The value of p1 is
obtained by fitting the rank function curve for the load shed
in the real systems data. If our objective is modeling a realis-
tic network, we can use any of the three solvers and by
adjusting the value of p1, we obtain the desired overall vul-
nerability (load shed curve). This can be seen in Fig. 14 for
the L4100 network. With systematic adjustment of p1, the
rank functions can be modified from showing a large dispar-
ity (the left panel) to very good agreement (right panel). Of
course, because the dispatch is different (each solver makes
different decisions), the obtained value for p1 will differ.
That is, since the dispatch has not been modified, the system
dynamics has to be modified in order to force the solutions
to converge. A possible application of this approach could be
to obtain the required p1 value for each of the dispatch solu-
tions, based on a prescribed load shed rank function. Based
on the results, because p1 is a measure of the reliability of
the lines in the network, the more reliable are the lines the
more robust is the system (load shed rank function pushed
down). In particular, solver 2 requires a smaller value of p1
in order to show the same performance as the other solvers,
which precludes it from the engineering point of view. The
preferred dispatch would be from solver 3, the least restric-
tive in terms of p1. Finally, these kinds of analyses have to
be done with care, because the fitting process accounts for
the risk discrepancy, but not necessarily the dynamical
differences.
A second approach consists of keeping the original p1,
but introducing modifications to the conditions of the dis-
patch to make them agree better, in particular, adding a small
random perturbation in the generator costs (values of ai in
the cost function Z, Eq. (1)). Thus, from the many possible
solutions due to the degeneracy of the problem, the random
perturbation in the generation costs favors one of them. We
cannot prove that there is only one solution so it could be
cases where degeneracy still persists even with the proposed
modification. However, the case studied shows an almost
complete destruction of the degeneracy. This is, the three
solvers converge to the same solution. The result is shown in
Fig. 15 for the L4100 network (the same case studied in the
first approach). In that case, a perturbation of one part in a
thousand is applied to the generators costs and, as can be
noted, the three solvers’ results match almost perfectly.
However, even if this seems a good approach, there is some
risk behind its use. It could happen in some cases that the
results are very sensitive to the particular random perturba-
tion chosen. This can happen because the random cost per-
turbation forces the three solvers to make the same choice
between all the possible degenerated states, but there is no
guarantee that this choice models properly the desired dis-
patch. The solution of course is not to do a random perturba-
tion but an intelligent one, as we discuss in the third approach.
In the third approach, useful for the case of linked net-
works, we ensure a more efficient distribution of the genera-
tion of electricity in each of the subsystems that we have
FIG. 14. Rank function of the normal-
ized load shed for the L4100 network
using the three solvers, (a) for a fixed
value of p1 and (b) for values of p1
leading to the same rank function.
FIG. 15. Rank function of the normalized load shed for the L4100 network
using the three solvers but with a slight random perturbation (on part in a
thousand) on the generator costs.
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linked to avoid the kind of dispatch shown by solver 2 in
Fig. 11. In the OPA model, this can be achieved by lowering
some of the generator costs in each of the zones (modifying
their ai), which reduces transmission of electricity across
zones and forces more of the generation to be local. For the
sequence of linked networks L, we set half of the generators
in each 100 node subsystem to a lower cost and then recalcu-
late the dynamical evolution of the sequence of networks. In
Fig. 16, the results of using the solver 2 with this modifica-
tion of the cost function against the solver 1 are compared to
the original cost function. The analysis is done for the L8100
and L16100 networks. Fig. 16 shows a relatively good agree-
ment between both solvers on the blackout size distribution,
when compared with the results of the solver 2 without mod-
ification. Also the risk function shows a better convergence
with the modified solver, as shown in Fig. 17. The reason for
the convergence of the solvers in this approach can also be
understood in terms of what we learned on the second
approach: the variation in the generator costs reduces the
degeneracy of the problem. Even if this third approach does
not allow so good agreement between solvers as the second
one, it will be preferred because of the physical arguments
behind it.
Therefore, by having at least partial generation dispatch
from each of the regions of the linked networks, many of the
problems due to the sensitivity to dispatch solutions may dis-
appear. A similar analysis could be done for the sequence of
Hbig networks as Fig. 4(b) suggests (some clusters can be
found visually), but a more complicated procedure would be
required.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Using the OPA model, we have been able to study and
characterize the mechanisms behind the power law tails in
the distribution of the blackout size. These algebraic tails
obtained in the numerical calculations are consistent with
those observed in the study of the blackouts for real power
systems. The OPA code uses the Simplex algorithm to calcu-
late the dispatch solutions for the same minimum of the cost
function. For this minimum cost, there may exist several dis-
patch solutions. We use three different solvers to model
some possible dispatch solutions and in this way evaluate the
sensitivity of the networks to the chosen dispatch solution.
These different solutions do not affect the minimum found in
the optimization problem through the Simplex algorithm
(because the solution is not unique) but when they are incor-
porated into the full dynamics of the system they may lead to
different levels of vulnerability.
To explore these effects, we have constructed different
sequences of networks of varying sizes. One is homogeneous
keeping the same distribution of distances between nodes as
we increase the size of the network; another is the same type
(homogeneous) but with the surface of the network increased
in a way proportional to the area. Finally, a third sequence is
obtained by linking smaller networks, using the connection
criteria of minimizing the transmission costs.
The results indicate that for a given network size, the
sensitivity to the dispatch increases when the network is built
from a linked set of smaller networks and also when the area
is increased. From the graph analysis point of view, there is
a strong suggestion that a high averaged cluster coefficient
together with a large size of the network causes increased
sensitivity to the dispatch method used.
FIG. 16. Rank function of the normal-
ized load shed using solvers 1 and 2
and solver 2 with modified generation
cost distribution as a function of the
number of nodes N, (a) for the L8100
node network and (b) for the L16100
node network.
FIG. 17. Risk using solvers 1 and 2 and solver2 with modified generation
cost distribution as a function of the number of nodes N.
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We have also explored how to decrease the sensitivity to
the dispatch method. Adding small discrepancies between
generation costs almost completely destroys the degeneracy
of the problem and thus eliminates the sensitivity. A disad-
vantage of that method is the lack of control about the particu-
lar solution at which the degeneracy converges, but an
intelligent non-random choice of the costs could constitute a
good approach. Based on this, another possibility for decreas-
ing the sensitivity consists of forcing the generation to be
partly local by distributing some low cost generation to the
clusters. With either of the two modifications both the rank
function of the load shed and the risk significantly reduce
their sensitivity to the dispatch solution used. This allows the
use of a computationally more efficient solver. In particular,
Solver 2 is computationally more efficient and, in those cases
where its solution is good enough, it should be the preferred
solver.
In future work, a more detailed analysis of the dispatch
solution and risk function in quantitative measures of the net-
work structure (radius of the network, average path length,
averaged clustering coefficient, and/or others) will be done.
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